Marquette Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 4 June 1939

Article 4

Original Beneficiary's Rights on Fraudulent
Change of Beneficiary in Insurance Policy
John B. Frisch

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
John B. Frisch, Original Beneficiary's Rights on Fraudulent Change of Beneficiary in Insurance Policy, 23 Marq. L. Rev. 204 (1939).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol23/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

NOTES
ORIGINAL BENEFICIARY'S RIGHTS ON FRAUDULENT
CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY IN INSURANCE POLICY
It is well established that when the beneficiary in a life policy or
benefit certificate can be changed at the will of the insured, the interest
of the beneficiary is contingent and becomes vested only upon the death
of the insured.' Thus, when a change is made, the original beneficiary
can not make a claim based on the policy or certificate before or after
the death of the insured.2 However, when the original beneficiary discovers that the insured was mentally incompetent at the time of the
change of beneficiaries or that the substitution of certificates was the
result of fraud or undue influence, his right to bring such information
before the court has not been so clearly determined.
The problems to be considered in the discussion of the beneficiary's
rights to sue under these circumstances are as follows: possible distinctions in cases of fraud, undue influence and mental incompetency
as affecting the right to sue, the different reasoning in fraud and mental incompetency cases, and the effect of a contract between the original
beneficiary and the insured.
The most cited case involving claims of fraudulent change of beneficiary is Hoeft v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor3 wherein it was
held that the original beneficiary has not a sufficient interest to sue the
substituted beneficiary on the basis of fraud. The insured had procured
a certificate to be issued in the name of his first wife. Upon her death,
a certificate was issued in favor of the children. Later, this certificate
was surrendered and another was issued in favor of the second wife.
The children claimed the substitution was a result of fraud on the
part of the second wife. The court denied an action could be maintained, "unless either by contract or in law they had some vested interest or right in the certificate which formerly had been taken out in their
favor. They claim no such vested interest by contract. If it exists at
all, then, it exists by operation of law. But, such rights are either constitutional or statutory, and we are referred to no law which secured
to them a right of action for such a cause. If they had a vested right
in the certificate as such, then, the insured himself, of his own volition,
and without fraudulent contrivance of a third person, could not substitute a new beneficiary. But this is not and cannot be claimed, for
the contract is between the order and the insured... Having no vested
I Malancy v. Malancy, 165 Wis. 642, 163 N.W. 186 (1917).
2Estate of Breiting, 78 Wis. 33, 47 N.W. 17 (1890). "Benefit certificates give
no vested interest before death. Payment of premiums by beneficiary is
immaterial."
3 113 Cal. 91, 45 Pac. 185, 33 L.R.A. 174 (i896).
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interest, nothing which the law protects or recognizes, it is legal
solecism to say that the beneficiary can be defrauded." The emphasis
appears to be upon the fact that the interest which was only contingent
was never realized. A later California case, New York Life Insurance
Co. v. Dunn follows the Hoeft case. The original beneficiary in her
cross-complaint alleged fraud and undue influence, but testimony of
these facts was not admitted and the cross-complaint discharged because the court held no cause of action existed in favor of the original
beneficiary.
In Cade v. Head Camp Pacific Jurisdiction Woodmen of the
World,5 there was a suit in equity against the association, alleging undue influence. The original beneficiary did not learn of the change until
she applied for the benefits when she discovered that her husband had
substituted his father and mother as beneficiaries. A demurrer to the
bill was sustained. Upon appeal the court affirmed this ruling and emphasized the fact that the original beneficiary would not acquire a
vested interest sufficient to claim the benefits of the certificate until the
insured died. The change, even though it might be fraudulent, was
made before the death of the insured, so that the very possibility of
acquiring a sufficient interest had disappeared.
Other cases, in which fraud is the basis of the claim, the right to
sue is not recognized because of this absence of a vested interest. In
Slaughter v. Grand Lodges the aid of the court was denied in an
attempt to annul the change and the court stated that in the matter of
benefit certificates, the contract is between the insurer and the insured,
so that when fraud is present, the imposition, if any, is upon the insurer
who alone can complain of it. There was a similar holding in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Bramlett which further pointed out
that if mental incompetency had been involved, the court would have
recognized the claim. However, the court disregarded all the cases in
support of the plaintiff's right to a cause of action because they were
all cases involving the problem of mental incompetency. This attempt
to distinguish between right to sue on the basis of mental incapacity
and the inability to sue because of a fraudulent change is not evident
4 46

Cal. App. 203, 188 Pac. 1028 (1920). Claims were made by the original

beneficiary and two subsequent beneficiaries. The insurance company presented

a bill of interpleader. The original beneficiary did not claim a contract existed
with the insured nor did she claim any special equities which would deprive

him of the right to make a change.

527 Wash. 218, 67 Pac. 603 (1902). "If there was no vested right in the wife,

no fraud could be perpetrated upon her by changing the beneficiary."

G192 Ala. 301, 68 So. 366 (1915). Allegations of fraud by the original bene-

ficiary based on a failure of second beneficiary to support the insured and the
original beneficiary as he agreed to do was properly demurred to. Summers

v. Summers, 218 Ala. 420, 118 So. 912 (1938).
224 Ala. 473, 140 So. 752 (1932).
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in any other case. But it is interesting to note that cases of fraud are
argued from the standpoint of interest of the beneficiary while the
cases of mental incompetency are considered from the standpoint of
the existence of only one contract, the original one.
Decisions in support of the original beneficiary's right to sue because of a fraudulent change of beneficiaries are very limited in number. In Conner v. Conner' the original beneficiary advanced money to
the insured, her husband, and paid nearly all of the assessments and
dues on the certificate upon the belief that she was to receive the benefits of the certificate. Upon the death of the insured, there was a bill
of interpleader by the fraternal benefit society and the rival claimants
were brought in. The court decided that this was really a contract
whereby the original beneficiary acquired a beneficial interest in the
benefit certificate which is enforceable in a court of equity. It appears
that the equitable interest is based on at least an implied contractual
relationship between the insured and the original beneficiary. In
Wherry v. Latiiner there was a bill in equity by the original beneficiaries alleging among other facts that the deceased was an invalid
for two or three years, suffering constant pain and that he used narcotics, becoming incapable of transacting business. While in such condition, it was claimed that he was induced to make a change of beneficiaries. No undue influence was found but the court held that the
allegations were such as to require an answer and the demurrer was
properly overruled. The court further stated that there was no disability on the part of the complainants as beneficiaries in the original
certificates to maintain the suit on the ground stated in the complaint.
Although there is a division of authority concerning the right to sue
on the ground of fraudulent change of beneficiaries, the cases involving
mental incompetency are consistent in recognizing claims of original
0
beneficiaries. A leading case is Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W. v. Frank."
Here, a benefit certificate was issued to the insured with his wife as
beneficiary. The certificate was later surrendered and a new one issued,
payable to the mother of the insured. But, the insured was found to
be insane at the time the change was made. The court admitted that
the original beneficiary had no vested interest prior to the death of the
insured, but added, "she had a contingent interest which vested at his
death and, unless there is some imperative rule of law which precludes
her from raising the question of his mental capacity, it should be held
that she had a right to intervene in this matter." The attempt to change
the beneficiary had failed because of a want of mental capacity on the
* 163 Ill. App. 436 (1911).
* 103 Miss. 524, 60 So. 563 (1913).
10 133 Mich. 232, 94 N.W. 731 (1903).
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part of the insured. This leaves the original certificate in force and
the interest that the original beneficiary had in that certificate became
vested upon the death of the insured. In Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W.
v. McGrath-' there was a similar fact situation and it was held that the
original beneficiary was in a position to raise the question of mental
incompetency.
The mental incompetency decisions stress the contract between the
insurer and the insured. 2 An attempted change constitutes a new contract which like all contracts is not enforceable when one of the contracting parties is mentally incapable of contracting. In McMurtray v.
McMurtrayf3 after overruling the demurrer to the complaint, the court
stated that the only valid contract that existed was the one of which
the complainant, the original beneficiary, was to receive the benefit. The
case of Shuder v. National Americans'4 after a similar contract argument, contains this statement, "If the insured died without making an
effectual change of contract, the rights of the plaintiff accrued and
she became entitled to the benefits specified in the certificate, the same
as if no attempt had been made to change it. That which was only
an inchoate interest became a contract right in case of no effectual
change, and therefore, a right to challenge the validity of the substituted certificate."
The consistency of the courts in the recognition of mental incompetency claims made by the original beneficiary in contract, the uncertainty in the recognition of claims of fraudulent change in insurance
problems shows the importance of the fact situation in the cases on
this subject. Its importance is further evident from the fact that the
existence of a contract between the original beneficiary and the insured
will result in recovery by the original beneficiary of the benefits of the
certificate not because of a fraudulent change nor because of a change
while insured was mentally incompetent, but rather because the existence of a contract invalidated any change.
In Wandel v. Mystic Tailers, 5 the insured had obtained a life certificate payable to his wife, under an agreement with her that she
should help pay the assessments. Shortly before his death, he surrendered the certificate and received another certificate, payable to his
sister who was a mere voluntary beneficiary. It was held that the wife
- 133 Mich. 626, 95 N.W. 739 (1903).
Offifl v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 101 Tenn. 16, 46 S.W. 758 (1898);
Carson v. Owen, 100 Ga. 142, 28 S.E. 75 (1897); Turner v. Turner (Tex.
Civ. App.) 95 S.W. 326 (1917); State Life Ins. Co. v. Coffrini, 285 Fed. 560

12

(C.C.A. 4th 1922); Gayl v. National Council, Knights & Ladies of Security,

178 Ill. App. 377 (1913).
23 67 Okla. 50, 168 Pac. 422 (1917).
3.4 101 Kan. 320, 166 Pac. 482 (1917).
Is 130 Iowa 639, 105 N.W. 448 (1905).
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had an equitable interest superior to the rights of the sister.a' A beneficiary, however, who merely volunteers to pay the premiums is not
in any better position than an ordinary beneficiary.17 Therefore, when
the original beneficiary pays dues and assessments on certificates, as
a result of an agreement with the insured, the interest is more than
merely inchoate and allegations of fraud, undue influence, or mental
incompetency are not the basis of recovery.
The position of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the matter of the
ability of the original beneficiary to claim a fraudulent change or that
one was made while the insured was mentally incompetent has not as
yet been determined. There are, however, Wisconsin decisions which
hold that the beneficiary of a benefit certificate has only a contingent
interest which does not serve as a basis for an action on the certificate
before the death of the insured even though the insurer has wrongfully
cancelled the policy."5 Likewise the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognizes the right of the original beneficiary to insist that in order to be
valid the change of beneficiary must be made in conformity with the
stipulations of the policy and the rules of the association'*
The latter case would seem to indicate that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court will recognize a sufficient interest in the original beneficiary to
bring an action for wrongful changes of beneficiaries, whether it is due
to non-compliance with regulations of the association or insurance
company or due to fraud, undue influence or mental incapacity. The
fact that in all cases of mental incompetency claims the courts have
considered the original beneficiary the proper party to present the
claim is reason enough to believe that when the matter comes up for
decision that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would make a similar
ruling.
It is submitted that in cases involving change of beneficiaries or of
changes due to undue influence that the rule of Conner v. Conner 0
appears to be the most just rule to follow.
JOHN B. FluscH.
"-McKeon v. Ehringer, 48 Ind. App. 226, 95 N.E. 604 (1911); Strange v.
Supreme Lodge K. P., 189 N.Y. 346, 82 N.E. 433, 12 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1206 (1907).
17 Preusser v. Supreme Hive of the Ladies of the Maccabees, 123 Wis. 164, 101
N.W. 358 (1904). In Supreme Council Catholic Benev. Legion v. Murphy,
65 N.'. Eq. 60, 55 Atl. 497 (1903) a beneficiary voluntarily paid the dues and
assessments and it was held that the wife's equity was so strong that a change
could not be..valid even if made of free will.
:1 Suelflow v. Supreme Lodge, Knights and Ladies of Honor, 165 Wis. 291,
162 N.W. 346 (1917). Rates of certificate were increased, but the insured refused to pay the increased rates. The policy was cancelled and the beneficiary was not allowed to bring an action for wrongful cancellation.
19 Faubel v. Eckhart, 151 Wis. 155, 138 N.W. 615 (1912).
zo Supra, note 8.

